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I
Even in states with an economic situation based on liberal prin-
ciples as in the United States of America, Switzerland or in the German
Federal Republic the enactment of laws regulating economic activities
has been inevitable for a long time for various reasons. For the United
States, K. Loewenstein' declares that today, in the middle of the
twentieth century the economic conditions in the states are, practically
speaking, entirely under the regulation of the State. For Switzerland,
the problem of the relations between the State and business, as E.
Ruck2 says, has found a solution appreciating in principle freedom of
economic life but admitting exceptions and limitations in the interest
of the public welfare and thus giving a compromise between the de-
mands of the general interest and private interests. Of great im-
portance is the purpose of reaching a satisfying solution of the social
problem (Soziales Problem) and of thus realizing a social state (So-
zialstaat). These approaches create very difficult problems with ref-
erence to the combination of a state under the rule of law (Rechts-
staat) and a social state, because the liberal state under the rule of
law allows only the fewest possible infringements on the sphere of
freedom and property, while the social state on the other hand in-
evitably brings such infringements on freedom and property.
These problems are especially important in the Federal Republic
of Germany as its Constitution, the Basic Law of May 23, 1949, de-
nominates the Federal Republic as a democratic and social federal
state (art. 20) and speaks of the principles of the republican, demo-
cratic and social state based on the rule of law (Rechtsstaat, art. 28,
par. 2).
The Constitution of the United States does not contain expressis
verbis the concepts of a state based on the rule of law and of a social
state, but even there the legislative power and the judicial control of
the legislation find themselves often faced with the problem of solving
a similar question: it is the dilemma of how far the regulations of
economic conditions by the state may go without giving up the prin-
ciples of a free economic system.
* Professor of Law, University of Munich, Germany.
1 Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungspraxis der Vereinigten Staaten 233 (1959).
2 Schweizerisches Staatsrecht 16, 105 (3d ed. 1957).
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The following observations will try to demonstrate a few general
directions or guiding principles for the solution of the aforesaid
dilemma. The examples will especially be taken from the jurisdiction
of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungs-
gericht).
It is not only the problem of the compatibility of the state under
the rule of law and the social state which poses large difficulties to its
solution but also the problem of the compatibility of the interests of
various economic groups. There are not only the often contrary in-
terests of the employers and the employees but also the often different
and opposite interests of various groups of enterprises, as e.g., in the
area of transportation of persons and goods between the railways,
shipping lines or motor vehicle carriers. All these various and often
opposing interests must be accorded with the general interest or the
general welfare. A fundamental principle of the social state is the
solution of the problem of the compatibility of the interests of em-
ployers and employees. Consideration must also be given to the com-
patibility of those interests with other group interests and with the
general interest. But it is important to see that the concept of the
social state is not the same as the concept of a socialistic state although
the ideas and views of socialism have had great influence on the de-
velopment of the problems of the social state. The modern social state
is not to be confounded with the earlier welfare state (Wohlfahrtsstaat)
of the era of absolutism. The absolute welfare state was characterized
by the regiment of the monarch who decided the content of what was
to be done on behalf of the general welfare. Today it is the democratic
parliament which decides the aforesaid problems and the means for
the realization of them.
II
The liberal state under the rule of law is embodied in the consti-
tutions, above all, in the basic rights and especially in the guarantees
of a free development of personality and free choice and practice of
occupation as well as in the guarantee of freedom of property. Free-
dom of property will be discussed later. It is well known that legisla-
tion in the United States had brought essential restraints for various
activities in the areas of commerce, production and transportation,
essentially founded upon the commerce-clause (art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3).
For comparative law it may be of interest to demonstrate current con-
ceptions in the Federal Republic of Germany containing general
standards giving answer to the question of the reasonableness of such
restraints.
The right of free development of personality is of importance in
the area of the economy especially with reference to the choice and
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practice of economic occupations and professions. In both respects
the German Basic Law contains fundamental regulations, contriving
an interpretation according to the spirit of greater economic freedom,
perhaps to a larger extent than is possible by virtue of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. This is possible because the German regula-
tions allow less room for an interpretation by the judge, than do the
very general regulations of the Constitution of the United States.
In the Constitution of the German Federal Republic the regula-
tion of art. 2, par. I is of fundamental importance:
Everyone has the right to the free development of his personality
insofar as he does not infringe the rights of others or offend against
the constitutional order or the moral code.
Of the same importance is the special regulation of art. 12, par. 1
of the Basic Law:
All Germans shall have the right freely to choose their occupation,
place of work and place of training. The practice of an occu-
pation may be regulated by legislation.
For the interpretation of all regulations concerning basic rights
the rule of art. 19, par. 2 must be taken into consideration:
In no case may a basic right be affected in its basic content.
The task of interpreting the basic content of a basic right often
poses very difficult problems for judicial control of legislation.
Every economic system laying claim to the name of liberal must
guarantee the freedom of industrial leadership. Every economic system
putting aside the freedom of industrial leadership (freies Unternek-
mertum) is not compatible with a liberal economic system, as E. R.
Huber3 clearly demonstrates. For the same reason an economic system
which permits private economic leadership in merely the formal sense,
while in all other respects exactly directs all conditions of production
cannot be called a free economic system. Therefore art. 2, par. 1 of
the German Basic Law is as Maunz-Durig4 notes, really a Magna
Charta against all economic systems of a socialistic state (Staats-
sozialisrnus) or of a state commanding alone all economic conditions
(staatliche Kommandowirtschaft).
Already these observations may demonstrate that even such
norms of a constitution, which though not directly relating to economic
conditions, may nevertheless have many consequences in the area of
economic conditions. Such standards provide remarkable limitations
against many regulations of economic questions by the state. Quite
3 Der Streit um das Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht, in: Die iffentliche Verwaltung
(DOeV) 135 (1956).
4 Maunz-Dfirig, Grundgesetz, Kommentar, Nr. 46 to art. 2, par. 1 (1959).
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reasonably, the German Federal Constitutional Court in a judgment
of July 20, 19541 has pronounced that the Basic Law guarantees neither
an economic neutrality of the executive and legislative power nor a
social market-economy (soziale Marktwirtschaft) regulated only by
means that are in accordance with the economic system of a free
market. An economic neutrality of the Basic Law is in the opinion of
the court only existent insofar as the Basic Law has not adopted
special economic provisions.
These observations of the Constitutional Court can be consented
to only with the reservation that some important basic rights place
very remarkable limitations upon regulations of economic conditions
by the state. Further it must be taken into consideration that the prin-
ciple of the social state is giving to the state a positive task, from which
on the one hand duties, and on the other hand limitations, of the
activity of the state are to be derived. It is quite right when Bachof6
declares that the basic rights must be seen and interpreted under the
declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany as a social state and
that this declaration contains an authorization and at the same time
a mandate on the state to realize a social system directed at realizing
and preserving social justice and affording relief of social need by
help of the state. In the same way has Ipsen 7 earlier demonstrated
that the formula of the social state is not a mere concept without real
content but a destination for the activity of the state.
Thus, it may be taken for granted that it is impossible to infer
from the Basic Law an unwritten law of an economic neutrality, as
Ballerstedt in a remarkable essay on the constitution of the economy
(Wirtsckaftsverfassungsrecht)8 very clearly emphasizes.
In connection with the problem of standards for the regulation of
business by the state the aforesaid observations, including the example
of the basic right of free development of personality as defined by
art. 2, par. 1 of the Basic Law and the principle of the social state,
might suggest that the constitution contains general principles often
standing in opposition to one another. Such a contrast certainly exists
between the demands resulting from the basic right of free develop-
ment of personality in connection with the principles of the liberal
state under the rule of law on the one hand, and the demands resulting
from the principle of social states (Sozialstaatsprinzip) on the other.
Forsthoff9 correctly noted that the state under the rule of law and the
5 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (=BVerfGE), vol. 4, p. 97, 17.
6 Vertiffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (=VVDStL),
vol. 12, p. 37, 80 (1954).
7 VVDStL vol. 10, p. 74 (1952).
8 In: Bettermann-Nipperdey-Scheuner, Die Grundrechte, vol. Ill/1, p. 1 (1958).
9 Begriff und Wesen des sozialen Rechtsstaates, VVDStL vol. 12, p. 8, 19 (1954).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
social state are in reference to their intentions very different and almost
antitheses, as the state under the rule of law aims at freedom while
the realization of a social state brings necessarily encroachments upon
freedom and property. Nevertheless, the state under the rule of law
and the social state do not exclude each other, for they must com-
plement themselves. The state under the rule of law must not be
abused as a refuge of the beati possidentes or it misses its social
mandate and endangers itself. A radical realization of the social state
leads to an executive state (Verwaltungsstaat) which cannot be a state
under the rule of law, as Forsthoff demonstrates. 10
For the law of the German Federal Republic, that contrast may
be especially clear, because the Basic Law itself speaks of the state
under the rule of law and of the social state. But also under other
constitutions, which do not contain such formulas, the same problems
arise, as the situation in the United States illustrates. The clause of
the social state may often be superseded by the task and competence
of the Congress "to provide for the ... general welfare of the United
States" (art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1). On principle it must be agreed that the
welfare clause and the tax clause of art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1 are closely
related; their development (e.g., the jurisdiction in the New Deal
cases) resulted in heavy encroachments on economic conditions."
The concept of the social state as well as the concept of general
welfare contain very difficult problems of interpretation, but perhaps
the concept of the social state may be clearer as it refers to an equitable
and just distribution of goods and income. It is not appropriate here
to discuss the concept of general welfare in all its detail,'" but it can
be said that it is nearly impossible to give an exact definition of that
concept. The meaning of that concept must be understood and inter-
preted in the light of the special conditions in a state at an appointed
time. But it may be, no doubt, that today even in the United States
the concept of the general or public welfare can not be understood
without taking into consideration elements of the principle of the social
state. Today the protection and help for economically weaker persons
is nearly everywhere an object of the activity of the state within the
scope of promoting the general welfare. And even in other states we
see similar contrasts between the liberal state under the rule of law
and the modern welfare state or the modern social state, as it is much
discussed in the German Federal Republic with regard to the text of
the Basic Law.
I' Ibid.
11 Cf. Loewenstein, supra note 1 at 119.
12 Cf. the very interesting essay by V. Bolgar, "The Concept of Public Welfare,"
8 Am. J. Comp. L. 44 (1959).
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The character of the state under the rule of law is setting bounds
to the demands of the social state and to the extension of encroach-
ments on freedom-free development of personality and property.
Such encroachments must, as Maunz-Durig' 3 demonstrates, be equal
and proportionate, that is, they must not injure an individual as a
bearer of basic rights more than is necessary in view of the object
aspired to by the state. In the same way it satisfies the requirements
of the state under the rule of law that the encroachments of the state
are ascertainable and that the individual must not be at the mercy
of the state. The consequences arising from the state under the rule
of law are therefore especially important with reference to the contents
and the form of encroachments on the economic conditions by the
state. Further there must be a sufficient protection of the affected
individual by the courts.
The above mentioned basic right, freely to choose and to practice
every kind of occupation, as embodied in art. 12, par. 1 of the Basic
Law is involved in the basic right of free development of personality.
It may be of interest that the basic right to freely choose and practice
every occupation has succeeded in the German Federal Republic
essentially upon the influence of measures of the American occupation
power, 4
The fundamental interpretation of the basic right of art. 12, par.
1 of the Basic Law finds itself in the judgment of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court of June 6, 1958.'1 This judgment has nullified a pro-
vision of a Bavarian law (art. 3, par. 1) relating to apothecary's shops
according to which the license for the establishment of a new apothe-
cary's shop is only to be given when the establishment of the new shop
is in the public interest for supplying the people with medicines. It
must also be established that the economic basis of the new shop is
guaranteed and that the economic basis of neighboring apothecary
shops will not be weakened to such an extent that their continued ex-
istence is no longer assured. The legal provision that emanated from
the opinion was that the establishment of new shops is only in the
public interest when their capacity is guaranteed and when the ex-
istence of the neighboring shops is not endangered. The principle of
liberty of trade has not succeeded for the apothecary shops. But the
Federal Constitutional Court did not follow those considerations and
nullified the aforesaid legal provision because of its contradiction to
art. 12, par. 1 of the Basic Law.
It is important to see how the court tried to interpret the meaning
13 Supra note 4, nr. 63-65, to art. 2, par. 1.
14 Cf. Bachof, "Freiheit des Berufs, in: Die Grundrechte," vol. III/i, p. 155, 159.
15 BVerfGE 7, 377.
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and the extension of the authorization of the legislative power while
regulating the practice of an occupation in a way satisfying the re-
quirements of the whole legal meaning of that basic right as well as
the requirements set by its importance in the social life. The court
maintained the view that the aforesaid authorization is given with
intent to regulate the practice of an occupation so that under this
point of view it shall be possible to regulate even the choice of an
occupation. Upon the basis of that view, the court developed the fol-
lowing principles which can be considered as very remarkable stand-
ards for regulations of business by the state and especially for the
regulation of the choice and the practice of an occupation:
The basic right (se. of art. 12, par. 1) shall protect the freedom of
the individual, the regulation-clause shall guarantee a sufficient
protection of the general interest. From the necessity to do justice
to both requirements follows for the encroachments of the legis-
lative power the order to differentiate perhaps according to the
following principles:
(a) The free practice of an occupation can be restricted inas-
much as it seems to be reasonable on account of the general wel-
fare. The protection of the basic right is restricted on the defense
of unconstitutional encroachments especially charging excessively
and requiring too much of a person.
(b) The free choice of an occupation must not be restricted
more than the protection of especially important goods of the
community it demands imperatively. When such an encroachment
is inevitable, it is necessary to choose that form of encroachment
which restricts the basic right as little as possible.
(c) When it is encroached upon the free choice of occupa-
tion by establishing certain conditions for the choice of occupation,
it must be distinguished between subjective and objective condi-
tions; for the subjective conditions (especially the training) must
be recognized the rule of proportion with the meaning that they
must not be out of proportion to the intended purpose of a due
practice of the occupation. Very strict requests are to be made
to the evidence of the necessity of objective conditions for the
beginning of an occupation; generally only the defense of heavy
dangers for goods of community (Gemeinschaftsguter) of eminent
importance may justify such measures.
(d) Regulations under art. 12, par. 1, sentence 1, must
always be made on that step which brings the smallest encroach-
ment upon the free choice of occupation; the next step is to be
entered by the legislator not till when it is proved with utmost
probability that the feared danger can not be opposed with (consti-
tutional) means of the previous step.
The Federal Constitutional Court has to examine if the legis-
lator has regarded the limitations ensuing from the aforesaid ob-
servations; when the free choice of occupation is restricted by
objective conditions for the beginning of occupation it must be
examined too, whether just that condition is inevitable with regard
to an eminent good of community.
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By virtue of those considerations the court nullified the aforesaid
legal provision of the Bavarian law relating to apothecary shops and
stated that in this area only the freedom of settlement defined as the
absence of objective conditions of admission meets the constitutional
requirement.
The practical difficulty lies, as the court demonstrates, in that
there must be combined the substantially free discretion of the legis-
lator in the area of economic and social policy and of policy relating
to the regulation of occupations with the protection of freedom guar-
anteed to the individual even against the legislator:
The right of freedom of the individual is so much effective the more
his right to choose freely his occupation comes into question; the
protection of the general interest is so much effective the more
detriments and dangers are heavy which can arise from an en-
tirely free practice of occupation. When it is tried to do justice
to both-in a social state under the rule of law equally legitimate
-demands, the solution can only be found from time to time by
way of a careful levelling of the importance of the opposite and
perhaps quite contrary interests. When it is held on that by virtue
of the principles of the Basic Law the free human personality is the
highest value . . . , follows that this freedom is to be limited only
in so far as it is inevitable with regard to the general interest.' 6
This judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court shows
clearly the difficult problems of all governmental regulations of busi-
ness. Scheuner 17 has demonstrated that a system of limited govern-
mental regulations of economic conditions is combinable with the
principles of a democratic constitution and with the legal system under
the rule of law. The essential condition for it must be, as he states, a
real limitation and an effective protection of the rudiments of personal
and economic freedom and of the principles of the state under the
rule of law.
III
With regard to governmental interventions in the area of busi-
ness, the standards and the limits ensuing from the basic right of
equality before the law are of great importance. It may be noted that
the advance of that principle in its historic development has brought
first the recognition of a merely formal equality and only after a rather
long time and under the influence of socialist ideas is a more and
more material equality achieved. The first step in achieving such
aspirations is to secure human existence and consequently the pos-
sibility of free development of personality. Thus the principle of
16 Id. at 404.
17 VVDStL 11, p. 1, 68.
1960]
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equality before the law gains great importance within the modern
welfare state or within the modern social state.
The question of the observance of equality before the law also
gains significance when the state promotes individual economic groups
by measures regulating economic conditions. The German Federal
Constitutional Court has examined that question with regard to the
question of the constitutionality of the "Investitionshilfegesetz" (law
relating to help of investment) of January 7, 1952. By virtue of that
law the industrial undertakings had to raise an amount of one milliard
of German Marks (DM) to cover the urgent demands for investment-
capital by the coal-mines, the ironworks and the power plants. The
law was challenged as violating the principle of equality before the
law. The court stated in its judgment of July 20, 1954,18 that law
regulating economic conditions is not unconstitutional for the reason
that it changes the conditions of competitive trade. Such laws can be
enacted, in the court's opinion, in the interest of individual groups,
but only when it is demanded by the general interest, and other interests
requiring protection are not neglected. The court demonstrates that
every governmental measure regulating economic conditions is an
interference with free economic gambling and the resulting situation
of competitive trade. When such governmental measures are once
constitutionally admissible, they cannot, in the court's opinion, be-
come inadmissible merely because they change the situation of com-
petitive trade; they would be inadmissible only when they should
justify the conclusion that the law had been enacted by a legislator
exceeding his discretionary power.
For a comparison with similar questions raised by the laws of
the United States, it is of interest that with the law relating to the
"Investitionshilfe" the legislator had adopted measures to promote
the general interest in favor of important industry. This law simul-
taneously brought about an important financial change in other indus-
trial undertakings because they had to raise the financial means for
investment. The Constitutional Court had refused, it is true, to con-
sider the financial charges of the industrial undertakings as taxes, as
defined in the constitution, but it has comparatively referred to charges
by taxes so that we can see a connection between taxes and the pro-
motion of the general welfare. Such a connection finds itself in the
tax power and the power to provide for the general welfare, as em-
bodied in art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 1 of the Constitution of the United States.
The Court entertained the view that industrial undertakings have long
been recognized as a special object of taxes and duties so that in this
jurisdiction even special taxes of single groups of occupations and
18 BVerfGE 4, 7.
[Vol. 21
CONTROL OF BUSINESS LAWS
branches of industry had been considered as compatible with the prin-
ciple of equality before the law, inasmuch as it can be justified by the
individuality of the circumstances. For those reasons the Court con-
sidered the law relating to the investment help (Investitionshilfegesetz)
as constitutional and not exceeding the discretionary power of the legis-
lator.
This example of the jurisdiction of the German Federal Consti-
tutional Court may show clearly the justness of the statement of
Scheuner,' 9 that the principle of equality before the law is most im-
portant for governmental measures regulating economic conditions,
because only from that principle can aid and direction be taken against
a deficient allocation of goods, inequitable compensation, or unequal
distribution of charges. That is the case especially with regard to
regulations in favor of or against certain economic groups. Whether
and how far the legislator profits by a constitutional competence is left
to his discretion within the framework of the constitution, and judicial
control has only the competence to examine whether the legislator had
exceeded the utmost bounds of his discretionary power. That must be
recognized especially for governmental measures regulating economic
and market conditions.
Whether the principle of equality before the law is violated can,
as Ipsen ° states, only be judged by the case under consideration and
by the purpose of the law under consideration. The principle of equal-
ity can be violated by a positive provision of a law or by an omission
of the legislator.
Those questions may be raised then even when the legislator
adopts measures which give decisive significance to the location of
individual undertakings or of a group of them. For the case of the
provision of power plants in Northern Germany with coal, Ipsen
has stated21 that the boards regulating economic conditions could order
the import and the purchase of more expensive (and with regard to
quality, less appropriate) English coal when the high duties to export
German coal do not guarantee a sufficient supply for the German con-
sumer of the Ruhr-coal. As Ipsen demonstrates, it is a violation of
equality before the law when such an order is only imposed on a single
group of consumers near the coast while on the other hand other
groups of consumers in the same area can obtain Ruhr-coal. The
principle of equality before the law required the same treatment of
all groups of consumers with the same location near the coast.
Equality before the law demands that on principle also, prices be
19 VVDStL vol. 11, p. 56, 73 (1954).
20 Gleichheit, in: Die Grundrechte, vol. 11, p. 189 (1954).
21 Ibid.
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levied in equal shares, as Ipsen demonstrates 2 when he says that the
significance of a principle of compensation for a violation of equality
before the law is growing in a system of intervention into economic
conditions by the legislative and executive power. Here can, and must,
the principle of equality positively demand equality of the distribution
of charges; that principle can be the basis of claims for compensation
and reparation, when governmental regulations contrary to the prin-
ciple have created inequalities in the distribution of charges. For some
time it was not admissible that one group of industrial undertakings
was discriminated against to the advantage of one or more other
groups and perhaps endangered in its existence, as Scheuner deduces
it from the principle of equality before the law.
2 3
Summing up, it can be stated that a governmental regulation
exceeding the charges of undertakings possible even under a critical
examination, though justified from the point of view of general eco-
nomic and social considerations, offends the principle of equality
before the law, and endangers the existence of the undertakings.
In connection with measures regulating economic conditions it is
permissible to adopt measures establishing prices, save that such
regulations could be always considered as violating the equality before
the law. So the German Federal Constitutional Court has stated in a
judgment of November 12, 1958,1 that the provisions of the law
relating to prices (§2) authorizing the federal minister of economics
(Bundeswirtsckaftsminister) and the highest authorities of the Laen-
der (member-states) to issue decrees fixing the prices, rents, duties
and other payments for goods, production, or services (except wages),
or to issue decrees holding up the present situation of prices do not
conflict with the principle of equality before the law. Of course, such
measures must not exceed the discretionary power of the legislative or
executive power; they must obey the demands resulting from the
principle of equality before the law and they must be issued in the
general interest.
As mentioned above in connection with the investment-help judg-
ment of the Constitutional Court, equality before the law may be of
essential significance in connection with economic regulations and
taxes. In a very interesting judgment concerning the collective taxa-
tion of marital partners, the court nullified the legal provisions on that
subject (judgment of January 1, 1957)25 and considered it as uncon-
stitutional when the wife has not the possibility of earning the same
22 Id. at 195.
23 VVDStL, vol. 11, p. 65 (1953).
24 BVerfGE 8, p. 274.
25 BVerfGE E 6, p. 55.
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income as the man under equal economic conditions. From that state-
ment it follows that laws relating to the beginning and the practice of
occupations and the earning of incomes of economic activities must
not discriminate against women because such a measure would be
contrary to equality before the law.
In the sphere of economic regulations of the state, the principle
of equality before the law has the general significance already noted
in an early judgment of the Constitutional Court of October 23,
1951:26
The principle of equality before the law is violated, when there
is no reasonable motive flowing from the nature of things or other-
wise evident for the legal distinction or nondistinction, in short,
when the legal provision must be considered as exceeding the dis-
cretionary power or as despotic.
Equality before the law is of great importance in connection with
the protection of property, but that problem will be discussed in the
following section.
IV
In connection with governmental regulations relating to economic
conditions, the protection of property is always an important part,
especially when it is the question whether a legal regulation can be
considered as a constitutional limitation of the property or whether it
is an expropriation. This question is, in the German legal system,
of essential importance, as art. 14, par. I of the Basic Law con-
tains the following provisions: "Property and the right of inheri-
tance shall be guaranteed. The contents and limitations shall be de-
termined by legislation." These provisions are completed by the
following provisions having an especially great importance in respect
to the principle of the social state: "Property shall involve obligations.
Its use shall simultaneously serve the general welfare."
The authorization of legislation to determine the contents of
property must be understood and interpreted in connection with the
provision of art. 19, par. 2 of the Basic Law according to which in no
case may a basic right be affected in its fundamental content. From
that provision it follows that notwithstanding the authorization of the
legislator to determine the contents and the limitations of the prop-
erty, this right may not be completely hollowed out. But it may be
agreed that the duty of the proprietor to use the property in a way
which simultaneously serves the general welfare admits limitations of
the property in the interest of the general welfare, and for the realiza-
tion of the principle of the welfare state on a larger scale than would
26 BVerfGE 1, p. 14.
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be considered admissible under a merely liberal legal and economic
system.
Ipsen,27 in a report about expropriation and socialization, has em-
phasized that the Basic Law with its decision for the social state has
provided a basis for deepening and proclaiming abroad this decision
according to the spirit of the Basic Law by an adequate shaping of
the social conditions. Ipsen states correctly that the concept of prop-
erty and of its meaning is subjected to a change of that meaning, and
that it is impossible to adopt the meaning of the concept of the prop-
erty according to the Constitution of Weimar of August 11, 1919. He
demonstrates that between the times of the Constitution of Weimar
and the Basic Law of 1949 lies a development which cannot be denied.
One which has led from its beginnings in the legislation during the
first world war relating to the planning and governing of economic
conditions to obligations of the rights of the proprietor by the pub-
lic law, into an economic system directed by the state in various
forms. The concept and the function of property must today be seen
from the vantage point of the experience of a generation which wit-
nessed an extraordinary extension of the state's influence over eco-
nomic conditions. As Ipsen states, the end of the second world war
has not brought the automatic end of all the controls of the state on
the economic sphere, and neither the state nor the individual can
relinquish the experiences of the governmental regulation of economic
conditions. They belong today-and not only in the German Federal
Republic-on principle to the contents of admissible legal dispositions
on property: "Property is today more open to governmental regula-
tions than it was in 1919. When art. 14 of the Basic Law guarantees
property, then it is this property and not the property of a legal system
which did not know a governmental regulation and control of the eco-
nomic conditions at all or at least regulations and controls of such a
kind.)28 From these observations, Ipsen draws the consequences that
from the fact that the present economic system of the social market-
economy (soziale Marktwirtschaft) wants to restrict itself to a min-
imum of economic regulations by the state, the conclusion must not
be reached that far-reaching regulations and limitations of property
should be unconstitutional with regard to the guarantee of the prop-
erty in art. 14 of the Basic Law, nor that such regulations and limita-
tions could only be made in the form of expropriation and in return
of compensation.
Opposed to this view, others demonstrate that even today by no
means all governmental encroachments upon the property are ad-
27 VVDStL, vol. 10, p. 74 (1952).
28 Ipsen, supra note 7 at 83.
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missible. Reinhardt2 emphasizes in connection with art. 14 of the Basic
Law, particularly the aforesaid obligation derived from art. 19, par. 2
of the Basic Law, not to affect a basic right in its basic content. He
states that the public authority is obliged to serve moderation in pro-
portion to private initiative on the one hand and public initiative on
the other hand: "Under the rule of the systems of private property
the public authority is inhibited to solve the problems of the social
life simply by an all directing system. It is much more obliged to find
out every conceivable way in which the desired compensation may be
reached by putting into action the self-responsible and industrious
decisions of the individuals."
From those general conceptions it does not follow that, therefore,
governmental regulations and other encroachments on the economic
conditions should be generally excluded. Reinhardt states3 ° that the
introduction of economic controls or distribution of goods according
to present conditions was founded upon the fact that because of an
extraordinary situation the market had fallen into a crisis and as a
result the provision of the people was endangered. Theoretically it
would be possible that the state assumes the responsibility for the
whole provision of the community. But according to the principles of
the constitution, it is only permissible to restrict the private initiative
of the employer to such an extent as it is necessary to prevent ex-
orbitant profits being drawn out of an abnormal situation while as-
suring the equal provision of the consumers. Reinhardt demonstrates
how the large obligations of the proprietor illustrate the meaning of
the social obligation of property arising out of a crisis and how that
obligation is fulfilled (according to the principle of the private utility
[prinzip der Privatnutzigkeit]) by striving for a just compensation
of all interests.
In connection with the question of the constitutionality of re-
straints of viticulture, the German Federal Constitutional Court has
stated in a judgment of July 10, 1958, 31 that the legislation fixing
limitations on the rights of the proprietor is not entirely free from
question. The motive of such limitations must be legitimated on the
basis of the general interest. Restraints of viticulture may only be
considered as constitutional, when .and as far as the public interest
can justify them from the point of view of the public interest and
subject to the principle of proportionateness. But the court points out
that the social responsibilities and obligations of the proprietor pro-
vide a relatively wide range for the discretion of the legislator. The
29 Reinhardt-Scheuner, Verfassungsschutz des Eigentums, p. 26 (1954).
3o Id. at 34 f.
31 BVerfGE 7, p. 71.
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court considers as admissible points of view in the light of such criteria
the securing of nourishment, ameliorating viticulture, or the protec-
tion of the wine producer when a social crisis is threatening and the
interests of other groups are not unequally neglected.
Economic freedom and the freedom of property are essentially
encroached on in the sphere of the building concerns. Here the ques-
tion often arises to what extent the legislator is authorized to impose
restrictions upon the erection of buildings by virtue of the social
obligations of the proprietor when an expropriation is in question
which creates a right of compensation. E.g., the Federal Court (Bun-
desgerichtshof) in a judgment of November 26, 1954,3- has stated
that an interdiction to build, that is a transitory interdiction to build,
is on principle to be considered as a social obligation of the proprietor
not creating a right of compensation when it serves the securing of
the realization of covering a ground with buildings (Bebauungsplan)
in the interest of the posgibility to erect buildings on that ground.
That is especially the case when such an interdiction to build deals
with large areas in towns which were destroyed in the last war. An
interdiction to build which serves only the execution of a general plan
of covering grounds with buildings in a town, or for a larger area only
in the general interest, demands, in the court's opinion, a special sacri-
fice of the affected proprietors in the general interest and is to be
compared with an expropriation. The attempt to distinguish situations
on the basis of the purpose of such interdictions is unsatisfactory be-
cause in general more and various purposes are involved. Therefore,
preference is to be given to the opinion of the Federal Administrative
Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) in the judgment of October 25,
1956," a where the legal character of such interdictions is judged by
the space of time of the interdiction: a long enduring interdiction is
comparable to an expropriation and gives a remedy in damages. How
the time for such an interdiction is to be limited cannot be established
with a general validity, but that question is submitted as a legal issue
for decision.
In relation to the building concerns it may further be mentioned
that the German Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshoj) in a judgment of
June 10, 1952,11 has stated that the housing control which has been
continued since the end of war because of the great lack of dwellings,
and the price-supervision relating to dwellings, are both justified as
social obligations of the proprietor of a house, and that those measures
cannot be considered as expropriations giving a remedy in damages.
32 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen (= BGHZ), vol. 15, p. 268.
33 Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts (= BVerwGE), vol. 4, p. 120.
34 BGHZ, vol. 6, p. 270.
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This example may show very clearly that it is nearly impossible to give
general standards for judging the reasonableness of governmental eco-
nomic regulations, because with the increase of available dwellings the
necessity of housing control may no longer be justified. There may
come a point of time at which such governmental regulations can no
longer be justified on the basis of the social obligation of the proprietor
of a house.
V
That various kinds of associations are seeking to establish their
influence in the formulation of economic conditions is of great im-
portance. Therefore the right to form associations is of very great sig-
nificance. Art. 9, par. 3 of the Basic Law guarantees that freedom:
"The right to form associations to safeguard and improve working and
economic conditions shall be guaranteed to everyone and to all pro-
fessions. Agreements which seek to restrict or hinder this right shall
be null and void; measures directed to this end shall be illegal."
The German Federal Constitutional Court has pointed out the
meaning of that basic right, especially in the judgment of November
18, 1954,3" and the court has stated that the basic right to form asso-
ciations deals not only with the association itself, but also with the
association toward the end of actively safeguarding and improving the
interests of employers and of employees. As the court states, that
means that freely formed associations can exercise influence on the
setting of wages and other conditions of labor and may come to col-
lective agreements (Kollektivvertrage). The historical development
has led to the point that such agreements are made in the legal form of
collective agreements with an authoritative character and the contents
of such agreements must not be changed by individual contracts. From
the point of view of its historical development, the meaning of the basic
right freely to form such associations as it is now guaranteed in art. 9,
par. 3 of the Basic Law must be interpreted in such a way that the
present legal system permits the possibility of collective agreements
and assured that the parties to such agreements are voluntary mem-
bers of freely formed associations.
The case under consideration dealt with the question whether
every freely formed association is, because of the Basic Law, legiti-
mated as a party to a collective agreement. The problem was whether
the legislator is obliged to consider every association of this nature as
party to a collective agreement or whether he can refuse it without
violating the basic right freely to form such associations. Quite prop-
erly, the court stated that it is the purpose of that right to protect such
35 BVerfGE, vol. 4, p. 96.
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associations which in view of their organization are independent
enough to plead effectively the interests of its members in the sphere
of labor law and in the social field. In any case the legislator must
not check the free development of the associations inappropriately.
Therefore, he must not inhibit free decision relating to the organic
form of the association. But he is not obliged in every case to admit
such unusual organic forms which are lacking in regard to effective
development.
From the historical development it may also be learned that the
"working and economic conditions" as they are mentioned in art. 9,
par. 3 of the Basic Law are only those conditions which play a part
between employers and employees in similar situations and which are
protected by the associations of the one group against the other, as is
demonstrated by Dietz.36 But that opinion is not uncontradicted. Fre-
quently, art. 9, par. 3 is interpreted in the sense that this basic right
also guarantees the freedom to form other associations in the sphere
of economic life. Maunz3 7 entertains the opinion that the freedom
freely to form associations also embraces the right freely to form
associations of employers with the purpose of restraining free com-
petition, that is, cartels. He points out that the right freely to form
associations in the sphere of labor law as was already guaranteed by
the constitution of Weimar of August 11, 1919, has been extended to a
general right to form associations in the sphere of economic condi-
tions. But that does not mean that all state restraint or control over
agreements of employers proposing to restrain free competition or to
regulate the market shall be excluded. That is implied from art. 9,
par. 2 of the Basic Law which restrains the general freedom of asso-
ciation. Art. 9, par. 3 provides that associations that are in contra-
vention of the criminal law, or which are directed against the consti-
tutional order or the concept of international understanding, shall be
prohibited. Under the constitutional order falls also the principle of
the social state from which restraints of the forming and of the activity
of cartels may arise.
The law against restraints of free competition of July 27, 1957
(Cartel-Law, Kartellgesetz) states (§1) that contracts of employers
or of associations of employers with a common purpose and decisions
of associations of employers are void as far as they attempt to in-
fluence production or the market conditions of the trade of goods or
industrial products by restraints of free competition. That is not ap-
plicable to contracts and agreements bearing upon the equal applica-
tion of general terms of business, sale conditions and terms of pay-
36 Die Koalitionsfreiheit, in: Die Grundrechte, vol. III/I, p. 417.
37 Deutsches Staatsrecht 126 (9th ed. 1959).
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ment. In addition, some exemptions are provided from the general
interdiction against cartels mentioned in section 1 of the aforesaid
law. Particularly, there is an exemption provided for price-cartels
when a restraint of free competition has become necessary from the
point of view of outweighing interests of general economic conditions
or general welfare.
Supposing for the moment that the right freely to form associa-
tions, as mentioned in art. 9, par. 3 of the Basic Law, also permits the
freedom of forming cartels, it is doubtful, as Maunz 8 points out,
whether the regulations of the Cartel-Law providing a general inter-
diction of cartels are constitutional and not contrary to art. 9, par. 3.
It is generally assumed that the basic rights guarantee not only
a positive freedom of association or coalition, that is the right freely
to form associations, but also a negative freedom, that is the right to
be free of an association.
VI
Within a brief essay it was only possible to point out a few ex-
amples in which the question of standards for governmental regula-
tion of business or of economic conditions act a part. I have tried to
give examples from the highest courts of the German Federal Re-
public, particularly the Federal Constitutional Court, which may have
their parallels in the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court.
When standards or principles of governmental regulations of
business are discussed, one may first think of positive standards which
shall indicate what the state must do, and not what it must refrain
from doing. But positive standards for the activity of the state re-
lating to economic conditions find themselves in the constitutions only
in a limited extent. It remains generally for the discretionary power
of the legislator and of the government to decide what kind of eco-
nomic system shall be realized, and only from the provisions which
place limits on the activity of the state do we derive direct restraints
of that activity. Indirectly, we find certain positive directions or
standards as far as such restraints contain interdictions for the realiza-
tion of other economic systems. From the point of view of those con-
siderations it must be understood why the economic system under the
Basic Law is denominated as a system of "economic neutrality." That
neutrality means only that the constitution has not decided explicitly
in favor of a certain economic system. Therefore the legislator and the
government are empowered to pursue at any given time the economic
policy which seems to be useful, as long as the conditions of the Basic
Law are observed. The present economic and social system is truly a
38 Ibid.
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system made possible by virtue of the Basic Law, but as the Consti-
tutional Court states, by no means the only possible system. It is due
to a decision of the legislator which can be replaced or pierced by
another decision.3 9
The statement of the Constitutional Court in the aforesaid judg-
ment, that the legislator may pursue every economic policy "as far as
the conditions of the Basic Law are kept," possesses a decisive sig-
nificance. The examples cited have shown that from the basic rights
come remarkable standards for the economic and social policy of the
state which do far more than establish limits upon that policy. Above
all, the principle of the social state contains a standard with an emi-
nently positive character, for it excludes a merely liberal economic
policy as defined by the sentence "laissez faire, laissez passer." To be
sure it may be difficult to state more or less exactly the contents of
that principle. But it may be said, according to Maunz,40 that on the
basis of that principle the state shall be constructed pursuant to the
principles of social justice. This means that every group or class of
the people shall have its due and that for everybody the possibility of
sufficient development of their economic and cultural existence is
guaranteed. Within the scope of that consideration Maunz defines the
social state as a state which refuses and opposes economic or cultural
suppression or the discrimination of a class or a group of the people
and which tries to remedy such suppressions or discriminations.
The essential problem for the legislator and the government is
the great difficulty in finding just compromises between the demands
of the principles of the social state, the demands of the general wel-
fare, and the demands of the state under the rule of law. The con-
sequences arising from the basic rights are inseparably linked with the
state under the rule of law. The standards of business regulation by
the state must be founded upon a just compromise of those principles
and the demands arising from the basic rights.
39 Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of July 20, BVerf GE, vol. 4, p.
17 (1954).
40 Id. at 60.
